MUNICH, Germany — You can either do what everybody else does and try to do it better than the rest, or you can try to do things differently.
Internazionale are a rarity among top European sides in that they play two strikers up front, Lautaro Martínez and Marcus Thuram. Only Atlético Madrid — among the elite — do this, and in some leagues, like the Premier League, nobody at all plays a front two on a regular basis.
On Tuesday night, the benefits of a striker partnership were more than evident at the Allianz Arena as Inter defeated Bayern Munich 2-1 in their UEFA Champions League quarterfinal first leg.
Inter’s front two combined brilliantly on the first goal, with Thuram’s sugar sweet layoff setting up Martínez’s scything outside-of-the-boot screamer off a Carlos Augusto cross. And you can make an argument that, apart from the first half hour, Bayern only developed a sustained threat after Thomas Müller came on to join Harry Kane in attack as a de facto second center-forward. It’s not just the fact that the old warrior scored to make it 1-1, it’s the fact that nearly half of Bayern’s cumulative xG of 2.65 came in the final 15 minutes, after moving to a front two.
In case you’re wondering, Davide Frattesi‘s winner — two minutes from time — had less to do with Inter’s front two and more to do with Eric Dier being out of position in transition and playing Augusto onside.
You don’t want to be overly simplistic, there’s evidently a reason why the front two — once the favored setup at the attacking end — has gone out of fashion. But precisely the fact that it’s rare makes it harder for teams to adjust.
Bayern boss Vincent Kompany stuck to his usual 4-2-3-1 set-up — despite a heavily depleted side — and it cost him, both defensively and on the attacking end. Kim Min-jae and Dier had to match up individually with Inter’s starters, and the discomfort, especially in transition, was palpable.
No defender wants a one-on-one in open space. Kompany’s idea might have been for Josip Stanišić, the emergency left-back, to hang back and help out as a spare man, but the upshot of that was it robbed Leroy Sané of help on the wing and left him mired in a string of fruitless dribbles.
Early in the game, Sané and Michael Olise on the opposite flank had experienced some joy from wide areas, and Bayern put together some half-chances and one gilt-edged one that Kane planted on the far post. But once Inter doubled up the wingers defensively and settled into the game, supply dried up. After that Kane chance in the 26th minute, Bayern managed just four shots, all of them off target, until 15 minutes from the end, when Müller came on.
What happened in the intervening 50-plus minutes? Well, when Bayern did attack, we saw that U-shape that frustrates fans. From wing to midfield, to the other wing and back around again. Pointless ball circulation, of the sort that happens when opponents are well organized and defend in numbers and usually ends up in a blocked cross or a shot that crashes into bodies or sails over the bar.
That’s what happens when Jamal Musiala, perhaps Bayern’s most important absentee, isn’t there. He has the skill set to create something out of nothing and float into tight spaces. Raphaël Guerreiro, who replaced him on the night, does not. But with Müller alongside Kane, suddenly there were two targets to aim at, two threats for Inter’s back three to worry about. Kane, so good at dropping and turning supplier, could now leave his post up front, knowing there was somebody else there to man it.
The lesson isn’t that everybody is stupid for playing a lone striker, and that a front two solves all problems. If you have a creative player like Musiala in the hole, by all means, play one up. So too if you have creative wingers or midfielders with the timing to get in the box and create mayhem. Bayern, however, had very little in either department on the night.
As for Inter, Thuram and Martínez have been together for nearly two seasons and have developed a chemistry that few forwards enjoy. They know when to come short or go long, when to split wide and attack the full-backs, and, as evidenced by the opener, they seem to know what the other one is going to do before he does it.
It doesn’t just work because of them, it works because Inzaghi’s Inter is tactically sound. What they lack in energy (the ubiquitous Nicolò Barella and a few others aside), they more than make up for in experience and nous. And they know how to press home every bit of advantage that they have.
They’re not the most gifted group left in the Champions League, and they don’t have, top to bottom, the best players. But when it comes to being a team, as in a unit that works for and with each other, few come close. And the front two have become a huge part of that.
